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Abstract
In this paper we propose an exchange rate model as solution of a
disutility based drift control problem. Given the exchange rate is a
function of the fundamental, we assume Government Authorities con-
trol the fundamental dynamics aimed at minimizing the discounted
expected disutility caused by the distance between the fundamental
and some specific target. The theoretical model is solved using the
dynamic programming approach and introducing the concept of vis-
cosity solution. We contribute to research on exchange rate control
policies by deriving the optimal interventions aimed at stabilizing the
exchange rate and preserving macroeconomic stability. We also show
that, under particular conditions, it is possible to derive the optimal
width of the currency band.
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stabilization policies; exchange rates.
1 Introduction
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the relevance of the
exchange rate stabilization policies has been causing frequent and forceful
interventions of the Government Authorities. The reactions to the Asian fi-
nancial crisis or the European Monetary System (ERM) accession represent
only some recent examples. The economies of East Asia have adopted a va-
riety of foreign exchange rate policies, ranging from currency board system
to “independently floating” exchange rates. Most of the Asian economies
have implemented “managed floats” that allow their local currency to fluc-
tuate over time within a limited range (Rajan and Zhang, 2002). The recent
enlargement of the European Union to 27 countries requires that the new
Member States fulfill a period of managed floating regime (ERM II) before
the adoption of the Euro. In this context, together with monetary and fis-
cal challenges, exchange rate policies have become a key tool for the new
EU members. Optimal exchange rate policies have to be set to manage the
hardening against the Euro. Interventions by Government Authorities are
required to stabilize the exchange rate even before the participation in ERM
II (Dean, 2004).
Another example is provided by the Chinese exchange rate system. On July
2005, the China’s Authorities announced that the Renmibi (RMB) would be
managed “with reference to a basket of currencies” rather than being pegged
to the dollar. According to the Public Announcement of the People’s Bank
of China (PBOC) on reforming the RMB Exchange Rate Regime, the Chi-
nese Authorities “make adjustment of the RMB exchange rate band when
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necessary according to market developments as well as the economic and
financial situation” and maintain “the RMB exchange rate basically stable
at an adaptive and equilibrium level, so as to promote the basic equilibrium
of the balance of payments and safeguard macroeconomic and financial sta-
bility”1. Although the RMB exchange rate adjustments initially were too
cautious, the announcement made possible transitional arrangements like
those applied in other emerging countries showing the PBOC’s awareness
of the unsustainability of the US Dollar pegging. The managed floating
exchange rate system, together with a more independent monetary policy,
might help the Chinese economy to cope better with both the internal and
external macroeconomic shocks to which a developing country may be ex-
posed (Goldstein and Lardy, 2009).
Exchange rate stabilization policies represent a crucial issue, and they have
been largely analyzed in the literature. Krugman (1991) emphasized the
role of official interventions at the margin of a currency band, when the
fundamentals driving the exchange rate follow a random walk with constant
variance. Most empirical results are controversial, leaving many questions
unanswered, such as the issues of the optimal monetary policy and the op-
timal width of the currency band (if adopted). Improvements of Krugman’s
framework are obtained thank to the extensions of the basic model (amongst
others: Jeanblanc-Picque´, 1993; Miller and Zhang, 1996; Mundaca and Ok-
sendal, 1998; Im, 2001; Zampolli, 2006; Castellano and D’Ecclesia, 2007).
Jeanblanc-Picque´ (1993) applies impulse control methods to show that us-
ing a diffusion process with constant coefficients it is possible to keep the
exchange rate in a given target zone with discrete interventions. Miller et
1http://www.pbc.gov.cn
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al. (1996) find a subgame-perfect solution for a Central Bank aiming at
stabilizing the exchange rate in a target zone, given proportional costs of
intervention. Mundaca and Oksendal (1998), using a jump diffusion process
for the exchange rate dynamics, combine continuous and impulse controls
to stabilize the exchange rate. Im (2001) presents the central bank opti-
mal intervention strategies to find the policy which minimizes the value of
the loss function. Assuming the economy randomly switches between dif-
ferent regimes, with time-invariant transition probabilities, Zampolli (2006)
examines the trade-offs deriving from deviations of the exchange rate from
fundamentals and from extreme changes. Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2007)
solve a stochastic optimal control model to describe exchange rate dynam-
ics in a managed floating regime assuming Government Authorities aim to
keep the aggregate fundamental not too far from a predetermined target
and within an optimal currency band.
In this paper, optimal exchange rate stabilization policies are taken into
account. We assume that the exchange rate is a function of the aggregate
fundamental whose dynamics is described by a stochastic differential equa-
tion (SDE) with a general functional shape for the state-dependent drift and
variance. The drift of the fundamental is the control variable to maintain
the fundamental level as close as possible to a time-varying target. We in-
troduce a disutility function that depends: 1) on the difference between the
aggregate fundamental and its target dynamics; 2) on the control variable.
The implicit costs associated with the interventions are measured in terms
of disutility. The stochastic control problem is solved using the dynamic
programming approach. The optimal strategies are obtained in two steps:
first, deriving the unique solution of the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB)
in the viscosity sense (Barles and Rouy, 1998); second, formalizing the ex-
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istence of the optimal strategies and their related paths according to the
regularity properties of the value function. The optimal trajectory of the
exchange rate is fully characterized. We also show that, under particular
conditions, the optimal width of the currency band can be determined.
The main innovations of this paper are represented by: 1) the choice of a
general shaped function for the stochastic dynamics of the aggregate fun-
damental; 2) the introduction of a disutility function which measures the
implicit costs of the intervention; 3) the definition of the endogenous cur-
rency band.
The work is organized as follows: the next section describes the model and
the related optimal control problem; section 3 presents the properties of
the value function and the optimal strategies; in section 4 a particular case
is discussed; some concluding remarks are presented in section 5, and the
mathematical derivations are reported in the Appendix.
2 The Model
This section describes the model developed to study the interventions of
Government Authorities in a managed floating regime. The building blocks
of the model are given by the exchange rate dynamics depending on some
random fundamental, the presence of a time dependent target and the op-
timization problem.
2.1 The exchange rate dynamics
We assume that the exchange rate depends on both some current funda-
mentals and expectations of future values of the exchange rate. The (log) of
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the spot exchange rate at any time t, st, is assumed to depend on an aggre-
gate ”fundamental”, ft, and a speculative term proportional to the expected
change in the exchange rate. As stated in Svensson (1992), the fundamental
absorbs the driving forces of the exchange rate (i.e. monetary and fiscal
policy variables, domestic output, price level, foreign interest rate, etc.).
Given a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P), a simple representation
of the spot exchange rate dynamics is given by:
stdt = ftdt+ λEt[dst] λ > 0, (1)
where:
• st is the logarithm of the exchange rate defined as unit of domestic
currency per unit of the reference currency;
• ft denotes the logarithm of the aggregate fundamental;
• λ is a constant positive parameter which can be interpreted as the
semielasticity of the exchange rate with respect to the instantaneous
rate of currency depreciation;
• Et[dst] measures the expected change of the exchange rate with respect
to time t.
The process for the fundamental, ft, is given by:
dft = µf (ft, θt)dt+ σf (ft)dBt, (2)
where:
• θt ∈ Θ, represents the control variable, used by Monethary Authorities
to manage the current fundamental dynamics, Θ is the admissible
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region defined as
Θ :=
{
θ : [0,+∞)×Ω→ [θm, θM ] Ft−adapted processes, θm < θM
}
;
(3)
• E[f2t ] < +∞;
• µf : R× [θm, θM ]→ R;
• σf : R→ R;
• Bt is a standard Brownian Motion.
We assume that the initial value of the fundamental, f0, is deterministic.
The effective aggregate fundamental, ft, consists of exogenous and endoge-
nous components. We further assume that Government Authorities, using
monetary, economic and fiscal policies, monitor the exchange rate and may
intervene in order to maintain the fundamental, ft, broadly in line with its
target. In particular, equation (2) states that Government Authorities in-
tervene on the control variable, θt, to manage the drift of the fundamental,
µf (ft, θt).
We set a target for the fundamental, f˜t, which includes a set of variables
affecting the exchange rate. For instance, some of the parameters set by
the European Commission during the process of EU accession have to show
some specific behavior, or some macroeconomic variables have to perform
according to given targets. In the case of China, the PBOC officially sets
targets for money supply (Burderkin and Siklos, 2008) and credit growth
”to maintain stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote eco-
nomic growth”2.
2http://www.pbc.gov.cn
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The evolution of the potential target is described by an ordinary differential
equation:
df˜t = βtdt, (4)
where:
• β is defined on [0,+∞);
• f˜0 is the deterministic initial value of f˜t.
We define the state-variable xt := ft− f˜t whose dynamics, given (2) and
(4), on the filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P), is given by:
dxt = d(ft − f˜t) = µ(xt, θt)dt+ σ(xt)dBt, t > 0 (5)
where:
• µ (xt, θt) = µf (ft, θt)− βt;
• σ(xt) = σf (ft) and σ(x) 6= 0, ∀x ∈ R;
• µ is a continuous real value bounded function with respect to the
process θ;
• x0 = x, is the deterministic starting point of the dynamics xt.
µ and σ satisfy the usual regularity conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of the solution for (5).
2.2 The optimization problem
The decision maker aims to reduce its disutility intervening on its preferences
as well as on the fundamental through the control variable θ. The expected
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disutility allows an assessment of the Government Authorities’ policies and
the total ”social” costs of the stabilization process.
The disutility function depends on the distance of the fundamental value
from its target, and it is controlled by θt. The larger the distance between
the fundamental and the target, the lower the satisfaction and the higher the
disutility. The control problem is solved finding the optimal control rule θt,
as a function of the state variable xt, that minimizes the expected discounted
disutility and the implicit costs of the control policies. We formalize the
dynamic optimization problem in terms of the value function, V : R → R,
presented as:
V (x) := inf
θ∈Θ
J(θ, x), (6)
with
J(θ, x) := Ex
{∫ +∞
0
e−γtu(|xt|, θt)dt
}
, for x0 = x, (7)
where:
• e−γt, with γ > 0, is the discount factor;
• u : [0,+∞) × [θm, θM ] → R is the Government Authority’s disutility
function;
• |xt| = |ft − f˜t| is the distance of the fundamental from its target;
• Ex is the expected value of the disutility, u, depending on the absolute
value of xt, whose dynamics are given by (5), with initial position x.
Since V is symmetric with respect to the origin we do not lose any
generality assuming x ≥ 0.
As stated above, u is increasing with respect to |xt| and continuous with
respect to θt. With no loss of generality, we assume that the disutility
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function is essentially bounded with respect to x and this implies, together
with the continuity of u with respect to θ in [θm, θM ], that also V is essentially
bounded with respect to x.
To clarify the concept of disutility function it may be useful to list some
specific functions:
• u(|xt|, θt) = θ2t · e|xt|; the disutility grows rapidly as the distance of the
fundamental from its target, |xt|, increases; Government Authorities
should intervene as soon as possible to avoid an explosion of the disutil-
ity; the control variable θt should be pushed downward to compensate
the growth of e|xt|.
• u(|xt|, θt) = |xt|exp
[
1
θt
]
; the disutility grows linearly as the gap |xt|
increases at a rate depending on θt; Government Authorities should
intervene to reduce the growth of the disutility, by pushing upward
the control variable θt.
The introduction of the disutility in the objective functional and its
dependence on the control variable guarantees that the optimal solution is
also the one minimizing the costs of the controls. The smaller is the distance
between the observed fundamental and the target, the smaller is the cost of
the control measured in terms of disutility.
3 The optimal policies
In this section, following the dynamic programming approach, we study
the properties of the value function and derive the implied Government
Authority’s optimal strategies.
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Theorem 1 The value function V is the unique classical solution of the
HJB equation:
γV (x) =
σ2(x)
2
V ′′(x) + min
θ∈[θm,θM ]
{
u(x, θ) + µ(x, θ)V ′(x)
}
; (8)
in (0,+∞), with boundary condition V (0) = 0 and V (+∞) =M > 0.
The proof is reported in the Appendix.
By Theorem 1, the optimal strategies in feedback form can be obtained.
Theorem 2 Consider x ∈ [0,+∞) and define
θ∗ ∈ argminθ
{σ2(xt)
2
V ′′(xt) + u(|xt|, θ) + µ(xt, θ)V ′(xt)
}
.
1. The closed loop equation:
dxt = µ(xt, θ∗)dt+ σ(xt)dBt, t > 0
x0 = x,
(9)
admits a unique solution.
2. Assuming that x¯t is the solution of the closed loop equation, we obtain
θt depending on x¯t; so we set θ¯t := θ∗(x¯t) and obtain:
dx¯t = µ(x¯t, θ¯t)dt+ σ(x¯t)dBt, t > 0
x¯0 = x.
Since J(x, θ¯) = V (x) holds, θ¯t is the optimal value for the control
variable, with the related optimal trajectory, x¯t.
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The proof is reported in the Appendix.
The existence of the optimal strategy x¯t implies the existence of an optimal
trajectory for the fundamental, f∗t := x¯t+ f˜t, given the relationship between
xt and ft. Starting from the optimal fundamental, a characterization of the
optimal exchange rate dynamics, s∗t , can be provided.
Next result allows to define the optimal exchange rate dynamics.
Proposition 3 Given the optimal fundamental f∗t , then the optimal ex-
change rate dynamics can be written as s∗t = h(f∗t ), where the function h is
the solution of the following second order differential equation:
σ2f (f
∗
t )
2
h′′(f∗t ) + Et[µf (f∗t , θ¯t)]h′(f∗t )−
1
λ
h(f∗t ) = −
f∗t
λ
. (10)
Proof. We look for solution of (1) introducing a function h:
s∗t = h(f
∗
t ). (11)
Applying Ito’s Lemma to (11), we have:
ds∗t = h
′(f∗t )df
∗
t +
1
2
h′′(f∗t )(df
∗
t )
2 =
= h′(f∗t )[µf (f
∗
t , θ¯t)dt+ σf (f
∗
t )dBt] +
1
2
h′′(f∗t )σ
2
f (f
∗
t )dt. (12)
The conditional expectation of ds∗t is given by:
Et[ds∗t ] = h′(f∗t )Et[µf (f∗t , θ¯t)]dt+
1
2
h′′(f∗t )σ
2
f (f
∗
t )dt.
Therefore, equation (1) can be rewritten as
h′(f∗t )Et[µf (f∗t , θ¯t)]dt+
1
2
h′′(f∗t )σ
2
f (f
∗
t )dt =
1
λ
(s∗t − f∗t )dt. (13)
Given (11) and (13), h can be found as solution of (10).
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4 Some applications: derivation of the optimal
currency band
To provide an explicit formalization of the optimal values for the control
variable, θ, as given in Theorem 1, in this section some particular cases are
discussed. For our purpose, we remove the assumption that x > 0 and con-
sider x ∈ R.
First of all, we argue that µ and u are assumed to exhibit the same be-
havior w.r.t. θ in [θm, θM ], and this means that if |x| increases, then u
and µ increase. Therefore, the intervention of the Government Authorities
through the control θ should push downward simultaneously µ and u. In
this particular example we assume the existence of A,B,C ⊆ R such that
A ∪B ∪ C = R and
A = {x ∈ R |µ(x, θ), u(|x|, θ) increasew.r.t. θ in [θm, θM ]} ;
B = {x ∈ R |µ(x, θ), u(|x|, θ) are constantw.r.t. θ in [θm, θM ]} ;
C = {x ∈ R |µ(x, θ), u(|x|, θ) decreasew.r.t. θ in [θm, θM ]} .
The optimization problem can be represented introducing the map gx :
[θm, θM ]→ R such that:
gx(θ) = u(|x|, θ) + µ(x, θ)V ′(x), ∀x ∈ R. (14)
According to Theorem 1, the optimization problem is solved by minimizing
the function gx w.r.t. θ. By assuming the right regularity for the functions
µ and u and applying the first order condition we get:
g′x(θ) =
∂u(|x|, θ)
∂θ
+ V ′(x)
∂µ(x, θ)
∂θ
= 0. (15)
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Under particular conditions, we are able to derive some intervention bands
for x, i.e. the regions where the optimal control rule is invariant. In partic-
ular, it is easy to choose µ and u such that two thresholds x1, x2 ∈ R, with
x1 < 0 < x2exist, with:
(i) A = (−∞, x1), B = [x1, x2], C = (x2,+∞);
(ii) A = (x2,+∞), B = [x1, x2], C = (−∞, x1).
A and C represent two intervention bands for x. The optimal strategies
can be written as follows:
(i)
θ∗(x) =

θm when x < x1
θM when x > x2.
(16)
(ii)
θ∗(x) =

θM when x < x1
θm when x > x2.
(17)
When x ∈ [x1, x2], then θ∗(x) can freely fluctuate. If x ∈ [x1, x2], then
f∗0 ∈ [x1 + f˜0, x2 + f˜0]. Furthermore, the behavior of the optimal exchange
rate dynamics is fully described by the function h in (11), which depends
on µf , σf , λ. Thus, when h is strictly monotonic, for instance increasing,
then f∗0 ∈ [x1 + f˜0, x2 + f˜0] implies that s∗0 ∈ [h(x1 + f˜0), h(x2 + f˜0)]. The
interval [h(x1+ f˜0), h(x2+ f˜0)] represents the optimal currency band for the
exchange rate dynamics, where no interventions occur.
To provide an intuitive understanding of the optimal strategies, we introduce
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the functions: u1, µ1, α : R → R and u2, µ2 : [θm, θM ] → R, such that the
drift and the disutility functions can be defined, respectively, as:
µ(x, θ) = µ1(x)µ2(θ), (18)
u(|x|, θ) = u1(|x|)u2(θ) + α(|x|), (19)
where (18) and (19) satisfy the regularity conditions given in Section 2 and
µ1 is increasing in [0,+∞) and decreasing in (−∞, 0).
In (18), the Government Authorities may apply a control θ, through µ2, in
order to let µ(x, θ) be close to µ(0, θ) and drive the process of the funda-
mental, ft, closer to its target, f˜t. Equation (19) provides a general example
of the specific disutility functions introduced in subsection 2.2.
Given (18) and (19), the map gx becomes:
gx(θ) = u1(|x|)u2(θ) + µ1(x)µ2(θ)V ′(x) + α(|x|), (20)
and applying the first order condition we get:
g′x(θ) = u1(|x|)u′2(θ) + µ1(x)µ′2(θ)V ′(x) = 0, (21)
from which, by assuming u1(|x|) 6= 0,
u′2(θ)
µ′2(θ)
= −µ1(x)V
′(x)
u1(|x|) . (22)
Assume that µ′2, u′2 6= 0 and the convexity of u2 and µ2 in [θm, θM ]. If
u′′2(θ)
u′2(θ)
>
µ′′2(θ)
µ′2(θ)
or
u′′2(θ)
u′2(θ)
<
µ′′2(θ)
µ′2(θ)
, ∀ θ ∈ [θm, θM ], (23)
then the function ρ(θ) = u
′
2(θ)
µ′2(θ)
is invertible and the optimal control θ∗(x) is
given by:
θ∗(x) = ρ−1
(
−µ1(x)V
′(x)
u1(|x|)
)
. (24)
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It is possible to consider the limit case of two dominant optimal policies:
one expansionary and the other restrictive (i.e.: optimal policies of bang-
bang type). In this case, the optimal currency band collapses to a single
value that is necessarily 0.
Now, assume µ2(θ) = u2(θ) = n(θ) twice differentiable and convex in
(θm, θM ).
The map gx becomes:
gx(θ) = n(θ)[u1(|x|) + µ1(x)V ′(x)] + α(x), (25)
and the first order condition gives:
g′x(θ) = n
′(θ)[u1(|x|) + µ1(x)V ′(x)] = 0. (26)
For µ1(x) 6= 0 in R, we have two cases:
• if
V ′(x) +
u1(|x|)
µ1(x)
= 0, for x ∈ R, (27)
then (26) is satisfied for each θ ∈ [θm, θM ] and the value x repre-
sents a specific distance between the fundamental and its target for
which Government Authorities may apply arbitrary decision rules. It
is natural that it must be x = 0: here, the target of the Government
Authority is reached and no intervention is needed;
• if
V ′(x) +
u1(|x|)
µ1(x)
6= 0, for x ∈ R, (28)
then (26) cannot be satisfied assuming an increasing (decreasing) n,
i.e. when n′(θ) > 0(< 0) for θ ∈ [θm, θM ]. However, the continuity of
gx and Weierstrass’ Theorem guarantee the existence of the optimal
16
strategies, belonging to {θm, θM}. More precisely, a critical region
Γ ⊆ R can be defined as follows:
Γ :=
{
x ∈ [0,+∞) |V ′(x)+u1(|x|)
µ1(x)
> 0
}
∪
{
x ∈ (−∞, 0) |V ′(x)+u1(|x|)
µ1(x)
< 0
}
.
(29)
We have:
– if n′(θ) > 0 in [θm, θM ], then
θ∗(x) =

θm when x ∈ Γ
θM when x ∈ R\ (Γ ∪ {x})
(30)
– if n′(θ) < 0 in [θm, θM ], then
θ∗(x) =

θM when x ∈ Γ
θm when x ∈ R\ (Γ ∪ {x}) .
(31)
Since u is an increasing function of |x|, then by (6) and (7) V increases
in [0,+∞) and decreases in (−∞, 0). As a consequence, further assumptions
on u1 and µ1 allow to derive some intervention bands for x. As a particu-
lar example, we have that if µ1(x) · u1(|x|) > 0, for each x ∈ [0,+∞) and
µ1(x) · u1(|x|) < 0, for each x ∈ (−∞, 0), then V ′ + u1µ1 > 0 in [0,+∞) and
V ′ + u1µ1 < 0 in (−∞, 0). Hence, Γ = R.
By (30) and (31), when Γ = ∅ or Γ = R, then there exists a unique opti-
mal strategy θ∗ ∈ {θm, θM} that the Government Authority can apply. In
particular:
• for Γ = ∅ and n increasing (decreasing), then θ∗(x) = θM (θ∗(x) = θm)
for each x ∈ R;
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• for Γ = R and n increasing (decreasing), then θ∗(x) = θm (θ∗(x) =
θM ), for each x ∈ R.
When Γ = (−∞, x), then Γ and (x,+∞) represent two optimal inter-
vention bands for x.
In this particular case, the optimal currency band for the exchange rates
collapses to a singleton. Given the optimal fundamental path f∗t := x¯t + f˜t,
then x = x implies f∗0 = x+ f˜0. By definition of the function h in (11), we
have that s∗0 = h(x + f˜0) is the threshold for the exchange rate where no
intervention is applied by the Government Authority. The set {h(x + f˜0)}
is the degenerate currency band.
4.1 Interpretation of the results
The optimal control is defined as a function of the gap registered between
the theoretical and the observed fundamental, (24).
To fix ideas, assume x > 0 (the case x < 0 is analogous). Given (23), ρ−1 is
an increasing function of its argument and the relationship between the op-
timal control, θ∗, and the variable x can be derived. θ∗(x) is directly related
to the disutility function, u1(|x|), and inversely related to the drift µ1(x)
of the state variable, xt, and to the growth rate of the expected disutility
function V ′(x).
In other words, if the Government Authority’s disutility is large, need for
strong interventions occur and a large value of θ∗ is chosen; on the other
hand, if the deterministic trend of xt or the change in the disutility is large,
then there may be a need for a small intervention of the Government Au-
thority.
For instance, considering the current international context, one can observe
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that some countries are experiencing a much lower growth rate than ex-
pected, and this causes a large value of the state variable, i.e. the distance
between theoretical and observed fundamental, and high level of disutility.
According to our model, this would require incisive interventions represented
by large value of θ, i.e strong measures of fiscal and monetary policy.
The optimal control, θ∗, described by (24) is applied whenever θ ∈ (θm, θM ).
This means that theoretical and observed fundamentals may differ one from
the other, but the difference is still within the optimal tolerance band:
x ∈ [x1, x2].
When x becomes too large (x > x2), or too small (x < x1), the optimal
strategies are given by (16) and (17) -or (30) and (31)-, which may repre-
sent the extreme interventions that Government Authority have to choose
in order to bring the fundamental closer to its target value.
In the case of the current economic situation, the observed fundamental may
result very far from the theoretical one, therefore strong interventions have
to be adopted, meaning large values of θ have to be chosen. For instance, in
terms of monetary policies this may be translated in monetary control ex-
ercised via manipulation of the monetary base or control of domestic credit
or bank credit or net foreign assets. The monetary policies to be adopted
are defined according to the each country’s internal targets such as infla-
tion and unemployment, and external targets such as competitiveness, the
current accounts, and reserves.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a disutility based drift control model for exchange rate
dynamics, in the framework of managed floating regimes. The dynamics of
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the exchange rate is described as a function of the aggregate fundamental
at time t, ft, which follows a Brownian Motion with state dependent drift
and volatility. The process for the fundamental dynamics are obtained as
the solution of a stochastic control problem describing the Government Au-
thorities’ aim to keep the value of the fundamental as close as possible to its
target. An expected disutility function minimization problem is developed,
and the related Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation is solved in viscosity
sense.
We show that under particular conditions, it is possible to obtain the opti-
mal width of the currency band. The model is realistic since it suggests a
more adequate process to describe the exchange rate dynamics and provides
an accurate analysis of the observed phenomenon with respect to simple
diffusion processes which may lack in economic content. The model takes
into account the time-varying features of the dynamics of the exchange rates
and the optimal strategies that can be applied by Government Authorities
to stabilize the exchange rate within a band.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
By Dynamic Programming Principle (see Yong and Zhou, 1999), we have
the following result:
Proposition 4 If V ∈ C0[0,+∞) ∩C2(0,+∞), then (8) holds in (0,+∞),
with the boundary condition V (0) = 0 and V (+∞) =M .
Equation (8) with the boundary condition holds formally, in the sense
that the regularity conditions required for the function V are assumed. Since
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V is generally not twice differentiable, then we proceed by proving the ex-
istence and uniqueness of the solution of (8) with boundary conditions in a
weak sense. To this end we use the concept of the viscosity solutions (for
a complete survey on viscosity solutions we refer to Crandall et al., 1992;
Barles, 1994; Fleming and Soner, 2006). The following result states the ex-
istence and uniqueness of the solution of the HJB (8) in the viscosity sense.
Such solution coincides with V .
Theorem 5 The value function V is continuous in (0,+∞) and can be
extended continuously on [0,+∞). Moreover, V is the unique viscosity so-
lution of the HJB equation (8) with the boundary condition V (0) = 0 and
V (+∞) =M .
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of a result in Barles and Rouy
(1998).
We now need to discuss the regularity properties of the value function to
prove Theorem 1. In fact, if V is at least twice differentiable, then Theorem
5 guarantees that it is the unique classical solution of (8) with boundary
condition V (0) = 0 and V (+∞) =M .
We firstly need to prove that V is concave. To this end, we fix x ∈ [0,+∞)
and real-valued function v ∈ C0[0,+∞) ∩C2(0,+∞) and define the Hamil-
tonian:
H(x, v(x), v′(x), v′′(x)) :=
γv(x)− σ
2(x)
2
v′′(x)− min
θ∈[θm,θM ]
[
u(x, θ) + µ(x, θ)v′(x)
]
. (32)
Writing
−H(x,−v(x),−v′(x),−v′′(x)) = 0, ∀ x ∈ (0,+∞),
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we obtain:
γv(x)− 1
2
σ2(x)v′′(x) + min
θ∈[θm,θM ]
[
u(x, θ)− µ(x, θ)v′(x)
]
= 0, (33)
for each x ∈ (0,+∞). The following lemma holds:
Lemma 6 (Barles, 1994) ϕ ∈ C0(0,+∞) is a viscosity supersolution (sub-
solution) of (8) if and only if ψ := −ϕ is a subsolution (supersolution) of
(33).
The previous result implies the following corollary.
Corollary 7 If ϕ is the unique viscosity solution of (8), then ψ := −ϕ is
the unique viscosity solution of (33).
In the following lemma we recall an important general result due to
Alvarez et al. (1997). This result is useful to prove concavity.
Lemma 8 (Alvarez et al., 1997) Let us consider an interval I ⊆ R and
define an hamiltonian operator
H˜ : I¯ × R× R× R→ R.
Assume that H˜ satisfies the following properties:
• there holds
H˜(x, v, p, q) = 0 ∀x ∈ I; (34)
• H˜ ∈ C0(I¯ × R× R× R);
• H˜ is elliptic;
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• It results
(x, v) 7→ H˜(x, v, p, 0)
concave, for every p.
Let v lower semi-continuous in I¯ be a viscosity supersolution of (34) and
define the convex envelope v∗∗ of v as
v∗∗(x) := inf
{
λ1v(x1) + λ2v(x2) |x = λ1x1 + λ2x2,
with xi ∈ I, λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, λ1 + λ2 = 1
}
.
Then v∗∗ is lower semi-continuous in I¯ and it is a viscosity supersolution of
(34).
Theorem 9 V is a concave function in [0,+∞).
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, it is sufficient to prove that
u := −V is a convex function. We use Corollary 7 and apply it to equation
(33).
Let us now define:
0 = γv(x)− 1
2
σ2(x)q + min
θ∈[θm,θM ]
[
u(x, θ)− µ(x, θ)p
]
=:
=: H˜(x, v, p, q) ∀x ∈ [0,+∞). (35)
It results:
H˜(x, v, p, 0) = γv(x) + min
θ∈[θm,θM ]
[
u(x, θ)− µ(x, θ)p
]
.
A direct computation gives us that the map
(x, v) 7→ H˜(x, v, p, 0)
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is concave for every p.
Furthermore, since σ 6= 0, for each x ∈ [0,+∞), then H˜ is an elliptic
operator.
Since the hypotheses of Lemma 8 hold, the convex envelope v∗∗ of v is a
viscosity supersolution of (35).
Using the definition of convex envelope, for each x ∈ [0,+∞), we have:
v∗∗(x) = inf
{
λ1v(x1) + λ2v(x2) |x = λ1x1 + λ2x2
}
≤ v(x), (36)
with the choice λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0, x1 = x, x2 arbitrary in [0,+∞).
If w1 is a viscosity subsolution and w2 is a viscosity supersolution of (35)
then, from the Existence and Uniqueness Theorem 5, we get w1 ≤ w2.
Given this result and (36), the convex envelope v∗∗ of v is a viscosity sub-
solution of (35).
By Theorem 5 and Corollary 7, v∗∗ is the unique viscosity solution of (35)
and, hence, the unique viscosity solution of (33). Therefore v = −V is
convex in [0,+∞) and the theorem is completely proved.
Next result guarantees that the viscosity solution of the HJB equation
is a classical solution.
Theorem 10 V is twice differentiable in (0,+∞).
Proof. Since σ(x) 6= 0, for each x ∈ (0,+∞), equation (8) is uniformly
elliptic in (0,+∞). Furthermore, given the concavity/continuity and adapt-
ing Alexandrov’s Theorem to this case (see Fleming and Soner, 2006), we
know that V is twice differentiable a.e. in (0,+∞). Therefore, it follows
that V ′ ∈ L∞(0,+∞), given µ, σ, u ∈ L∞(0,+∞), by definition.
Moreover, we can write, a.e. in (0,+∞),
V ′′(x) =
2
σ2(x)
{
γV (x)− min
θ∈[θm,θM ]
[
u(x, θ) + µ(x, θ)V ′(x)
]}
. (37)
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The right-hand side of the (37) is the sum of functions that are in L∞(0,+∞)
and, hence, we can state that V ′′ ∈ L∞(0,+∞).
Using previous arguments, we obtain that V is a function in the Sobolev
space W 2,∞(0,+∞).
Since (0,+∞) is an interval, the hypotheses of the Sobolev’s Embedding
Theorem (see Gilbarg and Trudinger, 1977) are trivially true and we get
V ∈ Cm(0,+∞), ∀m ∈ [0, 2). Therefore, V ′ is a continuous function, and
the second term of (37) is a combination of continuous functions: V ′′ ∈
C0(0,+∞).
The result is proved.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Theorems 5 and 10, we have the thesis.
Proof of Theorem 2
We first present a Verification Theorem to identify the optimal strategies
and the related optimal trajectories.
Lemma 11 Assume that v ∈ C0[0,+∞)∩C2(0,+∞) is the (classical) solu-
tion of (8) with the boundary condition V (0) = 0 and V (+∞) =M . Then:
• v(x) ≤ V (x), ∀x ∈ [0,+∞).
Let us, now, consider a pair of stochastic processes, (θ∗, x∗) with x∗0 = x,
such that
θ∗ ∈ argminθ
{σ2(x∗t )
2
v′′(x∗t ) + u(|x∗t |, θ) + µ(x∗t , θ)v′(x∗t )
}
,
then, θ∗ is optimal in x, and x∗ is the related optimal trajectory, if and only
if v(x) = V (x), ∀x ∈ [0,+∞).
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A detailed proof can be found in Fleming and Soner, 2006.
Given Theorems 1, 5 and 10, we can rewrite the HJB as:
0 = H(x, V (x), V ′(x), V
′′
(x)) = inf
θ∈[θm,θM ]
Hθ(x, V (x), V ′(x), V
′′
(x)), (38)
where
Hθ(x, V (x), V ′(x), V
′′
(x)) :=
γV (x)− σ
2(x)
2
V ′′(x)− u(x, θ)− µ(x, θ)V ′(x). (39)
Since µ, u ∈ C0[θm, θM ], then the function Hθ ∈ C0[θm, θM ] and Weier-
strass’s Theorem guarantees the existence of the absolute minimum point
θ∗ ∈ [θm, θM ] of the function Hθ defined in (39).
Proof of Theorem 2.
1. The proof follows from the existence of θ∗, shown in Lemma 11, and
by the existence and uniqueness of the solution for the state equation
(5).
2. The proof is due to Lemma 11.
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